

# NEW-YORK DAILY TRIBUNE, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1862.

## ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

Pemberton Retreating East—Campaign Probably Ended—The Design of the Rebels—Hoover's Movement on Grenada.

Special Dispatch to the Philadelphia Press.

Cause, Wednesday, Dec. 10, 1862.

Reports from Gen. Grant's army indicate that our forces are brought to a stand by the muddiness of the roads about ten miles beyond Grenada.

It is evident from the tenor of governmental dispatches that Gen. Pemberton, being wholly unable to cope with Grant in battle, has marched in rear toward Alabama, with a view of forming a junction with the Rebel forces in Tennessee.

Gen. Grant cannot now follow him in that direction. In this case Reserves should be reinforced.

Gen. Hoovers movement upon Grenada was speedily executed, but unfortunately the enemy had retreated to the northward, and Hoover could not cut off his retreat. It is rumored here that the Mississippi is almost clear of Rebels in force, and that Vicksburg can be easily taken.

The Rebels are acting as if, uncertain of any success, they would leave the South-West to its inevitable fate, and consolidating their forces for future operations in the Gulf or Cotton States.

The campaign so brilliantly begun by General Grant has failed of giving great results at present. If Reserves is successful, all will be well.

Porter and McClellan are awaiting developments, or orders, it is hard to divine which.

## THE McDOWELL COURT OF INQUIRY.

Gen. McClellan on the stand again.

The following is a continuation of General McClellan's testimony on Wednesday, Dec. 1:

Q. After the change of base to Fort Monroe, Yorktown, and on the Peninsula, was it any part of your plan that any of your forces should go to Fredericksburg?

Gen. McClellan—You mean the original part of my campaign, I presume?

Gen. McClellan—Yes, Sir.

Gen. McClellan—No, it was not—all the active troops were to move in the general direction of the Peninsula.

Gen. McDowell here asked and obtained leave to present several documents bearing on the case, which were read, as follows:

The correspondence embraces, among others, a letter from Secretary Stanton to Gen. McDowell, April 11, informing him that for the present and until further orders he was to consider the National Capital as especially under his protection, and to make no movement throwing his forces out of position for the discharge of this primary duty; and another, April 24, in which it is stated the President deems McDowell should not throw his forces across the Rappahannock at that time, but that he should get his bridges and transportation all ready, and wait further orders.

In the copy of instructions to McClellan, May 17, it appears that McClellan had asked for reinforcements.

The Secretary of War says to him: "The President is not willing to uncover the Capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were done, it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the Potomac and York Rivers, than by a land march; in order, therefore, to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen. McClellan has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route," etc.

McDowell, May 22, informs McClellan of his purposes, taking into view the position of the army.

The President writes McDowell, May 24, that Fremont has been ordered to move from Franklin, on Housatonic, to relieve Geo. Banks, and capture or destroy Jackson's and Davis' forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 30,000 men in motion at once for the Sesameon, moving on the line, or in advance of the line, of the Manassas Gap Railroad.

Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in cooperation with Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes with his movements, it is to be borne in mind, in reply to your stating reasons, that "It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds, that I have a heavy heart" in the matter, but that I feel it thrown on all hand, and from Richmond home, to do justice to our large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished."

The President writes McDowell: "I am highly gratified by your assent in obeying my orders; the change was painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one. Everything now depends upon the fidelity and vigor of your command." Gen. McDowell, in reply to your stating reasons, says: "It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds, that I have a heavy heart" in the matter, but that I feel it thrown on all hand, and from Richmond home, to do justice to our large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished."

Q. Did you frequently and daily see Gen. McDowell when he was at Fairfax Court-House in March last, and, if so, did you see him every day when the troops were ordered back to Alexandria? If so, state what was his condition at that time, or at any time during his stay at March last, whether he was or was not under the influence of liquor, state also how long you have known Gen. St. Dowd, and what has been his reputation among those who knew him as an abstainer from all intoxicating drinks.

A. I saw Gen. McDowell several times every day in March last at Fairfax Court-House, and also on the day the troops were ordered back to Alexandria.

He was in the same condition, entirely free from any effect of intoxicating liquor. I have known Gen. McDowell for nearly 20 years; have known him as one who abhors from anything in the shape of wine or spirituous liquor—I think, even from tea and coffee. (Laughter.) I know that he has been his reputation among all who have known him, and I could imagine nothing more absurd than the charge of drinking in any way under the influence of liquor.

Gen. McDowell here stated that he had no more questions to ask the witness at present. The following questions were then propounded by the Court:

Q. State whether Gen. McDowell was under your command at the time of your movement from the Potomac and the Peninsula?

A. He was.

Q. What orders were given by you to Gen. McDowell having reference to the movements on the Peninsula, and how did those affect the general plan of movement for the Army of the Potomac?

A. The orders were for Gen. McDowell to embark his corps upon the transports then engaged in carrying troops, and having his whole command embarked, to report to me for further orders at Fortress Monroe, or wherever I might happen to be, the intention being to move that corps as a unit by the York or Severn River, according to circumstances; that movement being an essential part of the campaign.

Q. Were these orders ever changed by you or others higher in authority; and if so, how?

A. They were not changed by me, but by the President of the United States. When in front of Yorktown, with a considerable portion of the army under fire, I received the first intimation of an intention to change the destination of Gen. McDowell's troops. That intimation was a telegraph dispatch from the War Department, informing me that Gen. McDowell's corps had been withdrawn from the army of the Potomac.

Q. Did you, after the investment of Yorktown, send any orders to Gen. McDowell, or did you request my orders to be sent to Gen. McDowell? If so, what was the tenor of such orders and of the reply from Gen. McDowell or from those whom the request was made to him?

A. I sent no orders to Gen. McDowell after the investment of Yorktown, for the reason that I received the information that he was detached from my command on the very day we arrived in front of Yorktown.

Q. When you caused the occupation of Hanover Court-House did you expect the co-operation of Gen. McDowell's corps, and if so, on what was such expectation based?—for what purpose was the co-operation desired, and what would have been the probable result of a junction of McDowell and Porter?

A. I hoped for the co-operation of Gen. McDowell's corps or Gen. McDowell's army; although that expectation was not the only reason for occupying Hanover Court-House, the expectation and hope of co-operation was based on information I had received at various times from Washington; the reason why this co-operation was desired was to increase our available strength sufficiently to insure the capture of Richmond, and, in my opinion, the junction of McDowell and Porter would have enabled us to accomplish the object of the campaign.

Q. That is, the capture of Richmond?

A. That question, however, I have already answered in my other testimony.

Q. Was such co-operation practicable, and by what routes was it, consistent, in your opinion, with the safety of the Capital?

A. The co-operation was practicable either by the direct land route from Fredericksburg to Hanover Court-House or by the water route, and was, in my opinion, consistent with the safety of the Capital.

Q. What force could the enemy at that time have disposed of for the threatening of Washington, and by what routes, and at what time could they have moved?

A. Gen. McClellan stated that he was perfectly willing to answer this question if the Court desired, but he would ask if it was not somewhat irrelevant, and a comment rather than a mere latitude.

The Court was then cleared, when, after the expiration of about half an hour, the doors were re-opened, and the decision of the Court was announced, that the question had been withdrawn.

The examination by the Court was then resumed.

Q. What was the distance at any one time between the pickets of Gen. McDowell and Porter?

A. I do not know what the position of Gen. McDowell's pickets was. I understood, some time after the occupation of Hanover Court-House by Gen. Porter, that a portion of Gen. McDowell's cavalry was twelve miles from there, but I do not know it; I cannot tell who told me, but I did not know the position of Gen. McDowell's pickets.

Q. You note that you received the following communication from Gen. McDowell in the plans and movements of the Peninsula campaign?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these plans for the Peninsula campaign which embodied the employment of the corps of Gen. McDowell known to the War Department or to the President?

A. Yes.

Q. You stated that troops were detained for the defense of Washington. Did those plans provide for a force to be retained from the troops then under your command, and if so, how large was the force to be retained, and what troops were to compose it?

A. I had none at the time.

Q. Did the formation of that department and the detention of McDowell reduce the means which had been arranged before you left Washington to prosecute the campaign?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether Gen. McDowell had any complicity in promoting or inducing the formation of the Department of the Rappahannock at the time that department was formed?

A. I had none at the time.

Q. Did the formation of that department and the detention of McDowell reduce the means which had been arranged before you left Washington to prosecute the campaign?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether Gen. McDowell had any complicity in promoting or inducing the formation of the Department of the Rappahannock or reducing your force?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was there any reply by you to the telegram of Gen. McDowell, or other notice to him, showing that you desired his cooperation?

A. I think no reply to Gen. McDowell, the War Department who informed that I wanted the troops!

Q. By Gen. McDowell. Do you recollect of the order to Gen. McDowell informing him his corps would be the last to embark; that is, after Summer was sent to him from the steamer Commodore, after you had left the Peninsula?

A. I think it was, and wrote a great many papers on that steamer.

Professor Cairnes's Lecture on the American Revolution in Dublin.

The Dublin Examiner thus speaks of the lecture Professor Cairnes delivered before the Dublin Young Men's Christian Association a few weeks since. Those who wish to read the lecture itself will find it at Crowley's, who has republished it in cheap form.

Prof. Cairnes's lecture, delivered last night in the Metropolitan Hall, is undoubtedly a very able, singularly clear and forcible, and as convincing as any discourse of the kind could be where opinion is so much divided. He is an ardent advocate of the North, and said everything in its favor that became a judicious and truth-loving advocate. It was unreasonable, no doubt, to expect, as many did in this country, that the Federal Government should have commenced and carried out the war as Abolitionists. They gave no ground for the expectation that they were going Southward on a crusade against Slavery. Mr. Lincoln was not elected as an Abolitionist. His return, it is true, was the defeat of the Slave Power. But he did not propose to cut it down or to uproot it, but only to prevent its extension. He would not let it dip its branches into the soil of the Territories, or of any of the Free States. But regarding it as part of the Constitution—as one of the institutions of the country—he would let it alone. His object was to defend the Constitution, and to preserve the Union. A fair and legitimate object. In seeking to attain it he was only doing the duty he had sworn to perform. It was not his fault that he had such bad materials to work upon—that the dry-rot of political corruption had eaten into the heart of the Constitution which he would save. He was placed in the White House to perform certain duties, and he did not shrink from the performance. It would have been well if he sympathized with the Negroes; but he did show them that he had a purpose for their reception whenever they could escape from their pugatory, and that they would find warmth and white women in the North to watch over them with tender interest, as the angle feuds for sinners of inferior race. But if the Northern whites were not angels nor even good Samaritans, but priests and Levites, who, seeing their poor black brothers and sisters of humanity with the marks of the whip on their bleeding backs, passed by on the other side, that was not the fault of the President. He could as easily wash the negroes white as eradicate the antipathy which caused the whites to shrink from contact with the blacks, as they would from the touch of a toad.

They North, not less than the South, regards negroes as an inferior race. But the South is more consistent than the North. "Through" is not to.

It is not afraid nor ashamed to carry out its principles to the letter, who would break every yoke and let the oppressed go free.

The President, however, is a man of high moral sense, and has been a good Samaritan, and a true friend to the slaves.

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